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Disgust is a protective emotion associated with certain types of animal fears. Given that a primary
function of disgust is to protect against harm, increasing children’s disgust-related beliefs for animals
may affect how threatening they think animals are and their avoidance of them. One way that children’s
disgust beliefs for animals might change is via vicarious learning: by observing others responding to the
animal with disgust. In Experiment 1, children (ages 7–10 years) were presented with images of novel
animals together with adult faces expressing disgust. Children’s fear beliefs and avoidance preferences
increased for these disgust-paired animals compared with unpaired control animals. Experiment 2 used
the same procedure and compared disgust vicarious learning with vicarious learning with fear faces.
Children’s fear beliefs and avoidance preferences for animals again increased as a result of disgust
vicarious learning, and animals seen with disgust or fear faces were also rated more disgusting than
control animals. The relationship between increased fear beliefs and avoidance preferences for animals
was mediated by disgust for the animals. The experiments demonstrate that children can learn to believe
that animals are disgusting and threatening after observing an adult responding with disgust toward them.
The findings also suggest a bidirectional relationship between fear and disgust with fear-related vicarious
learning leading to increased disgust for animals and disgust-related vicarious learning leading to
increased fear and avoidance.
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Disgust is considered to be one of the basic emotions and is
protective, preventing contamination and ingestion of harmful
substances (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Like fear and anxiety, disgust
is a defensive emotion (Davey, 2011) and is associated with certain
fears and anxieties, in particular, blood-injection-injury phobias
(de Jong & Merckelbach, 1998; Olatunji, Smits, Connolly, Wil-
lems, & Lohr, 2007), concerns with contamination in obsessive–
compulsive disorder (e.g., Moretz & McKay, 2008; Muris et al.,
2000), and fear of fear-relevant but nonthreatening animals
(Davey, Forster, & Mayhew, 1993; Matchett & Davey, 1991;
Ware, Jain, Burgess, & Davey, 1994). Fear and anxiety are both
components of anxiety disorders but are distinct from one another
(Davey, 2011): Anxiety is typically characterized as the anticipa-
tion of threat and experienced through feelings of fear, apprehen-
sion, and uncertainty, but fear is a direct response to a specific
perceived threat. Disgust may be important for different fears and
anxieties in different ways; for example, fear of blood can be
predicted by both disgust propensity (the tendency for individuals
to respond with disgust to disgust-eliciting stimuli) and disgust
sensitivity (the tendency for individuals to experience disgust as
particularly unpleasant), whereas disgust propensity is more im-
portant than disgust sensitivity in the prediction of spider fear (van
Overveld, de Jong, Peters, Cavanagh, & Davey, 2006).
The relationship between disgust and spider fear appears to be
particularly pronounced (Davey, 1994b; de Jong & Merckelbach,
1998; de Jong & Muris, 2002; Mulkens, de Jong, & Merckelbach,
1996; Olatunji, 2006; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1998). The phobic
response to spiders is typically made up of a combination of both
fear and disgust (de Jong, Peters, & Vanderhallen, 2002; Sawchuk,
Lohr, Tolin, Lee, & Kleinknecht, 2000; Tolin, Lohr, Sawchuk, &
Lee, 1997), but disgust is a stronger predictor of spider avoidance
than anxiety (Woody, McLean, & Klassen, 2005). Moreover,
disgust responses to stimuli appear to show greater resistance to
extinction than fear (Mason & Richardson, 2010; Olatunji, For-
syth, & Cherian, 2007), although they are not routinely targeted
during treatment (de Jong & Muris, 2002). Disgust-evoking stim-
uli also appear to hold attention at earlier stages of visual process-
ing than fear-evoking stimuli (van Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, &
Theeuwes, 2013), supporting a role for information processing
biases in disgust. An example of this is evidence of attentional bias
for disgust-related words in a Stroop task following emotional
priming; response latencies and memory for disgust words were
also found to be positively associated with disgust sensitivity after
disgust priming (Charash & McKay, 2002). Similar Stroop task
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biases are found in many psychopathologies (Williams, Mathews,
& MacLeod, 1996), including spider phobia (e.g., Kindt & Bross-
chot, 1997), social anxiety, and panic disorder (Hope, Rapee,
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990).
The disgust emotion does not appear to be present at birth, but
develops at some time before the age of 5 years (Rozin & Fallon,
1987). One way that stimuli are believed to acquire disgust-
eliciting status is via “contamination”: by coming into contact with
something that is already disgusting (Fallon, Rozin, & Pliner,
1984). Evidence suggests that these disgust contamination re-
sponses do not develop until approximately 7 years of age, al-
though an implicit understanding of contamination may be present
much earlier (Brown & Harris, 2012; Brown, Harris, Bell, &
Lines, 2012). The primary adaptive function of disgust may be to
protect against harm (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Matchett and Dav-
ey’s (1991) disease-avoidance model suggests that disgust plays
such an important role in some fears because it leads to avoidance
in an attempt to avert contamination. Many common animal fears
may be the result of the animals first becoming either associated
with the spread of disease, dirt or contamination, or possessing
disgust-evoking perceptual features (e.g., looking like mucus or
feces). Once this disgust status is acquired, cultural or familial
learning processes can lead to fear development (Matchett &
Davey, 1991). The association between a stimulus and disease or
contamination may be historic, as is likely to be the case with rats
or cockroaches, but may merely be superstitious or opportunistic,
such as the association of spiders with contamination and disease
in Europe in the Middle Ages (Davey, 1994a, 2011). Thus, threat-
or disgust-related beliefs and associations, even if unfounded, may
affect individuals’ fear and avoidance for stimuli.
The model suggests then that disgust is not only associated
with anxiety but also implicated in the etiology of certain fears.
Although associations between disgust and some stimuli are
well established, correlational studies do not explain the mech-
anisms by which they occur. Experimental evidence is required
to clarify these mechanisms. One way disgust might lead to fear
may be by changing how threatening an individual thinks a
stimulus is. Although inducing disgust does not in itself appear
to directly increase levels of reported anxiety (Marzillier &
Davey, 2004), it can lead to participants choosing more threat-
ening interpretations of words (Davey, Bickerstaffe, & Mac-
Donald, 2006). Inducing threat-interpretation bias has been
shown to increase anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000), so
this suggests that one link between disgust and anxiety may be
via such cognitive biases (Davey, 2011). Consistent with this,
Webb and Davey (1992) found increases in participants’ fear of
fear-relevant small animals after they watched a revulsive video
(hospital procedures), suggesting that disgusted mood can fa-
cilitate fear of certain stimuli.
Rozin and Fallon (1987) argued that children likely learn that
certain stimuli are disgusting via the verbal and nonverbal
expressions of others. This has obvious parallels with Rach-
man’s (1977) suggestion that fears can be acquired via verbal
information and vicarious learning. Studies suggest that animal
fears develop early, typically beginning around 8.6 years of age
on average (Öst & Treffers, 2001), with 62% first showing
between 5 and 9 years of age (Öst, 1987); thus, it makes sense
for experimental studies to look at the development of fear in
children around this age. Field and colleagues have presented a
wealth of evidence showing that verbal threat information about
animals can increase fear responses to animals in children
around this age, including increased fear beliefs, avoidance, and
heart rate responses to animals (e.g., Field & Lawson, 2003;
Field, Lawson, & Banerjee, 2008; Field & Schorah, 2007). In an
adaptation of Field et al.’s experimental paradigm, Muris,
Mayer, Huijding, and Konings (2008) gave 9- to 13-year-olds
disgust- and cleanliness-related information about animals. Re-
sults indicated that both disgust beliefs and fear beliefs in-
creased for animals about which children had received disgust-
related information and decreases were found for cleanliness-
related information. Follow-up studies also showed similar
effects when disgust was nonverbally induced (Muris, Huijding,
Mayer, & de Vries, 2012) and a bidirectional relationship
between disgust and fear in which disgust-related information
increased fear beliefs and threat information increased disgust
(Muris et al., 2009).
Rozin and Fallon (1987) suggested that stimuli might become
associated with disgust via social referencing: Children might
learn that an animal or object is disgusting after observing some-
one else acting disgusted in response to it. There is evidence that
fear can be learned in this way; for example, young infants (15–20
months of age) showed increased fear and avoidance of a toy snake
and spider after their mothers indicated that they were scary and
unpleasant (Gerull & Rapee, 2002), and this has also been ob-
served for flower and mushroom stimuli (Dubi, Rapee, Emerton, &
Schniering, 2008). Similar effects have been demonstrated in older
children (7- to 9-year-olds), who showed increased fear beliefs and
avoidance for novel animals after seeing pictures of them together
with pictures of fear faces (Askew & Field, 2007; Askew,
Kessock-Philip, & Field, 2008). Likewise, children may also be
able to learn that stimuli are disgusting via observation of others.
Each child in Muris, Mayer, Borth, and Vos’s (2013) study
watched as the experimenter showed their mother boxes of spec-
imens conveying information about attributes of the eating, sleep-
ing, and grooming habits of previously unknown animals. Speci-
mens were designed to either cause revulsion in parents toward the
animal (e.g., worms as food) or be neutral (e.g., fruit as food).
Children’s feelings of disgust for the animals was found to be
affected by verbal information from parents, but there was no
effect of the mother’s nonverbal expressions (e.g., facial expres-
sions and gestures) on children’s disgust or fear feelings for
animals. A possible explanation for the latter finding could be that
the disgust manipulation, although high in ecological validity, may
have been relatively mild (or at least inconsistent across partici-
pants) in terms of disgust conveyed nonverbally by parents to
children.
One way to avoid this would be for the experimenter to maintain
control over the intensity of the information conveyed to children
during vicarious learning. For example, Askew and Field (2007)
presented children (7–9 years of age) with pictures of novel
Australian marsupials (the quoll, quokka, and cuscus) together
with emotional faces in a series of animal–face pairing trials: one
animal was seen with fear faces (fear-paired), one with happy faces
(happy-paired), and one with no faces (control). Children’s fear
beliefs for fear-paired animals increased and were still indirectly
detected 3 months later. Children also avoided these animals more
than control animals in a behavioral task. Further studies using the
same procedure indicated that vicarious fear learning occurs for a
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range of stimuli, including flowers and snakes (Askew, Dunne,
Özdil, Reynolds, & Field, 2013), and is similar whether the model
is the child’s mother or a complete stranger (Dunne & Askew,
2013). Askew and Field (2007, 2008) have argued that stimulus–
stimulus associative learning processes underpin the vicarious fear
learning procedure such that the animal or object acts as the
conditioned stimulus (CS) and becomes associated with the fear-
related responses of the model acting as an unconditioned stimulus
(US). This methodology could also be useful to investigate the
effect of disgust vicarious learning on children’s disgust and fear
for animals.
The current study adapted Askew and Field’s (2007) method-
ology to show children pictures of novel Australian marsupials
(CSs) together with faces expressing disgust (USs). Children’s
disgust beliefs were measured before and after vicarious learning
to determine whether there was any effect of pairing animals with
disgust faces. It was expected that the disgusted responses would
become associated with the animals and lead to increases in
children’s disgust-related beliefs for them. Given the strong caus-
ative links in the literature between disgust and fear, measures of
children’s fear beliefs and avoidance preferences for the animals
were also taken. It was predicted that disgust vicarious learning
would lead to increases in children’s fear beliefs and avoidance for
the animals.
Experiment 1
Method
An adaptation of Askew and Field’s (2007) vicarious learning
procedure was used. Children saw each animal CS presented
together with either disgust face USs (disgust-paired), happy face
USs (happy-paired), or alone (unpaired control condition) in a
within-subjects design. This was counterbalanced across children,
so that there were three counterbalancing groups in which each
animal was paired with each face type or was unpaired. Self-
reported fear beliefs and disgust beliefs for animals were measured
before and after vicarious learning using a version of the Fear
Beliefs Questionnaire (FBQ; Field & Lawson, 2003). In addition,
children’s avoidance preferences were measured using a nature
reserve task (NRT; Field & Storksen-Coulson, 2007).
Participants. Sixty-two children between the ages 7 and 10
years (M  110.66 months, SD  10.05) were recruited from a
primary school in Surrey, United Kingdom (30 boys, 30 girls)
between the ages 7 and 10 years (M  110.66 months, SD 
10.05). Headteachers were informed about the procedures and
gave consent for the study to take place at the school. Parents/
caregivers were fully informed about what their child would be
asked to do via a letter sent home from the school that the child had
to return signed by parents. Informed opt-in consent was obtained
from parents/caregivers and all children gave verbal assent. There
were no children with consent who did not also give verbal assent.
No children were excluded for any reason at the recruitment stage
of the study. However, two children were excluded from all
analyses because of failure to follow instructions and data from a
further four children’s Disgust Beliefs Questionnaires (DBQs)
could not be included in analyses because of unanswered ques-
tions. Details about the socioeconomic status or ethnicity of the
children were not recorded.
Materials.
Stimuli. Animal stimuli (CSs) consisted of three different
pictures (400  400 pixels) of three Australian marsupials (quok-
kas, quolls, and cuscuses), nine pictures in total. These animals
were chosen because U.K. children are unlikely to know them
(e.g., Dunne & Askew, 2013) or have prior fear or disgust beliefs
for them. They have been successfully used in many similar
vicarious learning procedures (e.g., Askew & Field, 2007; Askew
et al., 2008; Dunne & Askew, 2013). Emotional face stimuli (USs)
consisted of 10 portrait pictures (400  485 pixels) of two facial
expressions (20 pictures in total) taken from the NimStim Set of
Facial Expressions (Tottenham, Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus, &
Nelson, 2002). Ten of the faces depicted disgust (five men, five
women) and 10 depicted happiness (five men, five women).
FBQ. A computerized version of the FBQ (Field & Lawson,
2003) was used to measure fear beliefs for the animals before and
after vicarious learning. This consisted of seven questions for each
animal, such as “Would you be happy to have a quokka/quoll/
cuscus for a pet?” Four questions were reverse scored. Children
responded on a 5-point scale (0 no, not at all; 1 no, not really;
2  don’t know/neither; 3  yes, probably; 4  yes, definitely).
The final score was divided by the number of questions to produce
a score ranging from 0 to 4 for each animal in which 0 was the
lowest and 4 the highest level of fear beliefs. Internal consistency
(Cronbach’s alpha) was moderately high before learning for the
three animals:   .68 for the cuscus subscale;   .69 for the
quokka subscale;   .65 for the quoll subscale; and high after
learning for the three animals: .84, .80, and .84, respectively.
DBQ. A DBQ was completed by children to measure their
disgust attitudes for the animals before and after vicarious learn-
ing. This was almost identical to the Muris et al. (2008) scale with
some small modifications to wording. It consisted of three ques-
tions: “Would you carefully wash your hands if you had touched
a quokka/quoll/cuscus?” “Would you hold your nose if you were
close to a quokka/quoll/cuscus?” “Would you prefer to wear
gloves if you had to stroke a quokka/quoll/cuscus?” Responses
were given on the same scale as the FBQ and were also averaged
to give a score ranging from 0 (lowest) to 4 (highest). Internal
consistency for the three animal scales was relatively low before
learning:  .54 for the cuscus subscale,   .60 for the quokka
subscale, and   .71 for the quoll subscale; and was similar for
the three animals after learning: .66, .66, and .58, respectively. The
relatively low reliability scores were not that surprising because
the DBQ consists of only three items and Cronbach’s alpha is often
lower for smaller scales. To test this, we combined the quokka,
cuscus, and quoll subscales into a single general “disgust for
unfamiliar animals” scale. Before learning, Cronbach’s alpha for
this scale was .85, and after learning, it was .79, confirming that
small scale size may have been responsible for the low internal
consistency of the animal subscales.
NRT. The NRT (Field & Storksen-Coulson, 2007) was used to
measure children’s avoidance preferences for disgust-paired and
unpaired animals after vicarious learning. The nature reserve itself
consisted of a green-painted wooden board (450 mm  600 mm),
embellished with fabric flowers and plastic trees positioned around
the edge so that children were unable to “hide behind” them.
Children were told the animals live in the nature reserve; over two
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trials, the disgust-paired and the unpaired animals were placed, one
at a time, at one end of the board. Children were then asked to
place a Duplo figure representing themselves on the board where
they would prefer to stand if visiting the reserve; the distance (in
millimeters) from the center of the animal picture to the Duplo
figure was measured to determine children’s avoidance prefer-
ences: The farther children placed the figure from the animal, the
higher the level of preferred avoidance.
Procedure. The experiment was automated on a Pentium 4
laptop computer with a 15-in. monitor, using software custom
written (Field, 2010) in Visual Basic.net with ExacTicks 1.10
(Ryle Design, 1997). Pictures of each of the three marsupials
(40  40 mm) were shown to children and they completed the
DBQ. Next, children completed the FBQ: Each question was
presented at the top of the screen above a picture of the
respective animal and children used a mouse to click an on-
screen button displaying their response. Following the ques-
tionnaires, the vicarious learning phase commenced with a
picture of an animal appearing on the screen for 1 s, followed
by a picture of either a disgusted, happy, or no face appearing
next to the animal on the opposite side of the screen for a
further 1 s; each pairing trial lasted 2 s in total. Timings were
identical to previous, similar studies (e.g., Askew & Field,
2007; Askew et al., 2008, 2013; Dunne & Askew, 2013). The
order of animal images and pairing type (disgust-paired, happy-
paired, or unpaired) was random. Each child was presented with
one animal (e.g., a quokka) with 10 faces (e.g., disgust), a
second animal (e.g., a quoll) with 10 faces (e.g., happy), and the
third animal (e.g., a cuscus) appeared alone with no faces
(unpaired) 10 times. The condition in which each animal was
presented was counterbalanced across children. Following vi-
carious learning, the DBQ and FBQ were administered a second
time, followed by the NRT. Children were debriefed and given
age-appropriate information and worksheets about the animals.
Results
Fear beliefs. Mean changes in self-reported fear beliefs for
each pairing type (positive, disgust, and unpaired) are displayed
in Figure 1. An initial three-way 3 (pairing type: disgust, happy,
unpaired)  2 (time: before vs. after)  3 (counterbalancing
order: cuscus disgust-paired, quokka disgust-paired, and quoll
disgust-paired) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was con-
ducted to check that learning was not greater in any of the
counterbalancing groups. There were no significant main effect
or interactions involving counterbalancing group and therefore
no indication that learning was influenced by the visual appear-
ance of any specific animal. Thus, the analysis was collapsed
into a two-way 3 (pairing type: disgust, happy, unpaired)  2
(time: before vs. after) mixed ANOVA to test predictions that
disgust vicarious learning would increase fear beliefs. There
was a borderline significant main effect of time, F(1, 59) 
3.89, p  .053, p2  .062, and significant main effect of pairing
type, F(2, 118)  6.19, p  .003, p2  .095. The crucial Pairing
Type  Time interaction was significant, F(2, 118)  5.17, p 
.007, p2  .081, indicating an effect of vicarious learning on
children’s fear beliefs for the animals. Planned contrasts did not
find significant changes in fear beliefs for happy-paired animals
(prelearning: M  1.80, SD  0.70; postlearning: M  1.51,
SD  0.88) compared to unpaired animals (prelearning: M 
1.86, SD  0.69; postlearning: M  1.68, SD  0.87), F(1,
59)  1.04, p  .31, r  .13. However, there was a significant
increase in fear beliefs for disgust-paired animals (prelearning:
M  1.85, SD  0.66; postlearning: M  1.96, SD  0.75)
compared to unpaired animals, F(1, 59)  4.41, p  .040, r 
.26, indicating that seeing animals with faces expressing disgust
increased children’s fear beliefs for animals.
Disgust. Figure 2 displays mean changes in self-reported dis-
gust ratings for each pairing type. An initial three-way 3 (pairing
type: disgust, happy, unpaired)  2 (time: before vs. after)  3
(counterbalancing order: cuscus disgust-paired, quokka disgust-
paired, and quoll disgust-paired) mixed ANOVA conducted on
disgust beliefs found no significant main effects or interactions
involving counterbalancing order. Therefore, the analysis was col-
lapsed into a two-way 3 (pairing type: disgust, happy, unpaired) 
2 (time: before vs. after) mixed ANOVA. There was no significant
main effect of time, F(1, 55)  3.06, p  .086, p2  .05, but there
was a significant effect of pairing type, F(2, 110)  4.25, p 
.017, p2  .07. The important Pairing Type  Time interaction
was significant, F(2, 110)  3.37, p  .038, p2  .06, indicating
an effect of vicarious learning on children’s disgust beliefs.
Follow-up comparisons found no significant difference in changes
in disgust beliefs for disgust-paired animals (prelearning: M 
2.42, SD  0.84; postlearning: M  2.44, SD  0.92) compared
to unpaired animals (prelearning: M  2.30, SD  0.80; postle-
arning: M  2.21, SD  0.90), F(1, 55)  0.67, p  .42, r  .11,
or happy-paired animals (prelearning: M  2.39, SD  0.88;
postlearning: M  2.09, SD  0.83) compared to unpaired ani-
mals, F(1, 55)  3.08, p  .085, r  .23.
Avoidance preferences. On average, children placed them-
selves farther away from disgust-paired animals (M  19.48 cm,
SD  12.35) than unpaired animals (M  16.65 cm, SD  12.04).
A paired-samples t test (one-tailed) indicated, as predicted, that
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Figure 1. Mean (and SE) changes in self-reported fear beliefs for happy-
paired, disgust-paired, and unpaired animals.
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children preferred to avoid the disgust-paired animal compared to
the unpaired animal, t(59)  1.72, p  .045, r  .22.
Relationship between fear beliefs, disgust beliefs, and avoid-
ance preferences. Controlled change scores for fear beliefs, dis-
gust beliefs, and avoidance preferences were calculated for disgust-
paired animals. These were mean change scores for disgust-paired
animals relative to changes for the unpaired control animals and were
simply calculated as the difference between mean changes for disgust-
paired animals and mean changes for unpaired animals. For exam-
ple, children’s controlled changes in fear beliefs were computed by
subtracting the mean change in fear beliefs for unpaired animals
from the mean change in fear beliefs for disgust-paired animals.
There were significant correlations between controlled increases in
fear beliefs and disgust beliefs, r(54)  .42, p  .001, and
controlled increases in fear beliefs and avoidance preferences,
r(58)  .47, p  .001. Similarly, controlled increases in disgust
beliefs correlated with controlled avoidance preferences for
disgust-paired animals, r(54)  .53, p  .001. This demonstrated
that increases in children’s fear beliefs and avoidance preferences
following disgust-related vicarious learning were directly related
to increases in their disgust beliefs.
Avoidance preferences are likely to be a consequence of in-
creased fear beliefs for animals. One possibility is that disgust
beliefs play a role in the relationship between fear beliefs and
avoidance, so that the effect of increasing fear beliefs on avoidance
is greater when disgust beliefs for an animal are also high. If this
is the case, we would expect disgust beliefs to mediate the effect
of fear beliefs on children’s avoidance preferences for animals
following vicarious learning. A Hayes-style (2013) mediation
analysis confirmed this: There was a significant indirect relation-
ship between increases in fear beliefs and children’s avoidance
preferences through increases in disgust beliefs (using controlled
change scores again), b  1.916, bootstrapped confidence interval
(BCa CI) [0.676, 4.146], with effect size k2  .174, BCa CI [.065,
.298]. Figure 3 shows the model for this mediation effect.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 showed that children’s fear beliefs for animals in-
crease as a result of seeing them together with pictures of people
looking disgusted and these increases are associated with increases in
disgust beliefs for the animals. In addition, children preferred to avoid
animals they had seen with disgust faces. This avoidance was pre-
dicted by increases in fear beliefs for the animals and mediated by
increases in disgust beliefs. However, disgust beliefs for animals did
not increase significantly for animals following disgust vicarious
learning. Unfortunately, this may have been due, in part, to the low
reliability of the measure used. Thus, it was not possible to determine
conclusively from Experiment 1 whether disgust modeling led di-
rectly and independently to increased fear beliefs or whether these
changes were in parallel with increased disgust beliefs.
There may be differences between the effects of fear and disgust
vicarious learning; for example, fear vicarious learning may have
a greater effect on fear beliefs than disgust vicarious learning.
Conversely, disgust vicarious learning may lead to greater in-
creases in learned disgust than fear vicarious learning. Given the
role of disgust in fears, another possibility is that fear vicarious
learning leads to increases in disgust beliefs, as well as having
established effects on fear beliefs and avoidance (e.g., Askew &
Field, 2007; Askew et al., 2013). Feelings of disgust may play a
part in animal fears even when the original learning was fear-
related rather than disgust-related. If fear vicarious learning does
increase disgust, and disgust is an important element in some fears,
avoidance preferences may be mediated by these increases in
disgust, just as they are in disgust vicarious learning.
To examine this in more detail, Experiment 2 replicated the first
experiment with two additions. First, an additional measure of disgust
beliefs for animals was created because the reliability of the scale used
in Experiment 1 was unclear. Second, in addition to a group of
children who saw disgust vicarious learning, a second group saw fear
faces during vicarious learning. This meant that the effect of fear
vicarious learning on disgust beliefs could also be examined and
comparisons could be made between the effects of fear vicarious
learning and disgust vicarious learning on children’s fear beliefs.
Given the overlap between fear and disgust and the fact that they are
both negative emotions and facial expressions, the two types of
learning were manipulated separately in a between-groups design.
Figure 2. Mean (and SE) changes in self-reported disgust beliefs for
happy-paired, disgust-paired, and unpaired animals.
b = 5.151, p = .002 b = 0.372, p = .001 
Increase in disgust 
beliefs (DBQ) 
Avoidance 
preferences (NRT) 
Increase in fear 
beliefs (FBQ) 
Direct effect, b = 3.618, p = .011 
 Indirect effect, b = 1.916, 95% CI [0.676, 4.146] 
Figure 3. Mediation model of increases in children’s fear beliefs follow-
ing disgust vicarious learning as a predictor of avoidance preferences and
mediated by disgust beliefs for the animals. DBQ  disgust beliefs
questionnaire; FBQ  fear beliefs questionnaire; NRT  nature reserve
task; CI  confidence interval.
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This design meant that there was no chance of contamination of fear-
or disgust-related responses from either the fear- or disgust-paired
animal to the other paired animal, while still allowing for the two
types of learning to be compared. Given the findings from Experiment
1 and previous fear vicarious learning studies (e.g., Askew & Field,
2007), it was expected that disgust vicarious learning would increase
fear beliefs and avoidance preferences for animals, and fear vicarious
learning would increase fear beliefs and avoidance preferences.
Again, given the overlap between fear and disgust in animal fears,
corresponding increases in the additional measure of disgust were also
expected and these were predicted to be associated with increases in
fear measures.
Method
The manipulation in Experiment 2 was essentially the same as
that in Experiment 1; however, this time there were two groups of
children. Approximately half of the children were presented with
an identical vicarious learning procedure as that in the previous
experiment: One animal was seen with disgust faces, one with
happy faces, and one with no faces. The remaining children saw
one animal with fear faces (fear-paired), one with happy faces
(happy-paired), and one with no faces (unpaired), also in a within-
subjects design. Thus, the vicarious learning procedure was iden-
tical for this group except that children always saw one of the
animals with fear faces rather than disgust faces. Again, the type of
face seen with a specific animal was counterbalanced across chil-
dren. Self-reported fear beliefs and two measures of disgust beliefs
for animals were compared before and after vicarious learning
along with avoidance preferences again.
Participants. Fifty-eight children (25 boys, 33 girls) were re-
cruited from three schools across the United Kingdom; they were
between the ages of 7 and 10 years (M  109 months, SD  8.75).
Twenty-nine children were randomly allocated to the disgust vicari-
ous learning group, and 29 children were randomly allocated to the
fear vicarious learning group. As in Experiment 1, informed consent
was obtained from parents/caregivers and children gave verbal assent.
No child who had parental/caregiver consent was excluded from the
study and all gave verbal assent. Details about the economic or ethnic
background of the children were not recorded.
Materials.
Stimuli. Animal images and disgust and happy faces were
identical to those in Experiment 1. In addition, 10 images (also
400  485 pixels) of fear faces (five men, five women), also from
the NimStim Set of Facial Expressions (Tottenham et al., 2002),
were used.
Fear and disgust beliefs questionnaires. The same measures
of fear and disgust were used again in Experiment 2. Internal
consistency for the FBQ was good before learning for the three
animals;   .75 for the cuscus subscale,   .62 for the quokka
subscale,   .71 for the quoll subscale, and high after learning:
.89, .85, and .86, respectively. For the DBQ, internal consistency
was relatively low again before learning for all three animals;  
.49 for the cuscus subscale,   .58 for the quokka subscale,  
.53 for the quoll subscale, and slightly higher after learning: .67,
.58, and .52, respectively.
Disgust visual analogue scale (disgust VAS). Children were
asked how disgusting they thought each of the three animals was
and responded in each case on a visual analogue-type scale. The
scale consisted of a 100-mm continuous line from not at all
disgusting to extremely disgusting, and children were instructed to
mark the line according to how disgusting they felt the animal was.
A disgust score between 0 and 100 was created for each animal.
Evidence suggests that typically developing children’s cognitive
abilities are sufficiently developed to understand and use a VAS by
age 7 years; accuracy is less reliable in children under the age of
5 years (Shields, Palermo, Powers, Grewe, & Smith, 2003).
NRT. As in Experiment 1, the NRT was used to measure
avoidance preferences. This experiment measured avoidance pref-
erences toward all three animals: negative-paired (fear- or disgust-
paired depending on group), happy-paired, and unpaired.
Procedure. Children completed the DBQ and disgust VAS by
hand, followed by the computerized FBQ. Children in the disgust
group received the same vicarious learning procedure as in Exper-
iment 1: one animal with disgust faces, one with happy faces, and
one unpaired. Children in the fear group saw fear faces instead of
disgust faces as in previous studies using this procedure (e.g.,
Askew & Field, 2007); therefore, one animal was seen with fear
faces, one was seen with happy faces, and one was unpaired.
Children then completed the FBQ, DBQ, and disgust VAS for a
second time, followed by the NRT. Finally, children were fully
debriefed and given correct information and worksheets about the
animals.
Results
Fear beliefs. An initial four-way 2 (group: disgust vs. fear) 
3 (pairing type: negative, happy, unpaired)  2 (time: before vs.
after)  3 (counterbalancing order: cuscus disgust-paired, quokka
disgust-paired, and quoll disgust-paired) mixed ANOVA exam-
ined whether there were any effects of counterbalancing group on
children’s fear beliefs. None were found and the analysis was
subsequently collapsed into a three-way 2 (group: disgust vs.
fear)  3 (pairing type: negative, happy, unpaired)  2 (time:
before vs. after) mixed ANOVA. There was a significant main
effect of pairing type, F(2, 112)  9.40, p  .001, p2  .14, but
not time or group. The Pairing Type  Group, F(2, 112)  4.28,
p  .016, p2  .07, and Pairing Type  Time, F(2, 112)  18.96,
p  .001, p2  .25, interactions were significant, but the Time 
Group interaction was not.
The Pairing Type  Time interaction, important for testing
predictions, was significant, F(2, 112)  18.96, p  .001, p2 
.25, showing that fear beliefs changed because of vicarious learn-
ing, increasing or decreasing depending on the type of face animals
had been seen with. Planned comparisons found that fear beliefs
increased significantly for animals seen with negative (disgust and
fear) faces, F(1, 56) 9.25, p .004, p2  .14, and decreased for
animals seen with positive happy faces, F(1, 56)  13.24, p 
.001, p2  .19. In addition, the critical Pairing Type  Time 
Group interaction was significant, F(2, 112)  8.16, p  .001,
p2  .12, indicating a significant difference in the vicarious
learning effects between the disgust and fear vicarious learning
groups. Thus, this interaction was broken down further in two
two-way 3 (pairing type: negative, happy, unpaired)  2 (time:
before vs. after) repeated measures ANOVAs performed on each
group. For children in the disgust group, there was a significant
Pairing Type  Time interaction, F(2, 56)  4.03, p  .023, p2 
.13, showing that children’s fear beliefs for animals changed as a
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result of vicarious learning. Planned comparisons showed that fear
beliefs increased for animals seen with disgust faces, F(1, 28) 
6.27, p  .018, r  .43 (medium-sized effect), compared with
unpaired animals, but did not change for animals seen with happy
faces, F(1, 28)  0.11, p  .74, r  .06. In the fear group, the
crucial Pairing Type  Time interaction was also significant,
F(1.65, 46.20) 20.24, p .001, p2  .42 (Greenhouse–Geisser).
Comparisons indicated that increases in children’s fear beliefs due
to fear pairing were approaching borderline significance, F(1,
28)  3.19, p  .085, r  .32, showing a medium-sized effect
(Cohen, 1988, 1992), and decreases due to happy pairing were
highly significant, F(1, 28)  25.11, p  .001, r  .69. Figure 4
displays mean changes in fear beliefs following vicarious learning
in the two groups.
Disgust beliefs. Figure 5 displays mean changes in disgust
beliefs for negative, happy, and unpaired animals following vicar-
ious fear and disgust group learning. A preliminary four-way 2
(group: disgust vs. fear)  3 (pairing type: negative, happy,
unpaired) 2 (time: before vs. after) 3 (counterbalancing order:
cuscus disgust-paired, quokka disgust-paired, and quoll disgust-
paired) mixed ANOVA found no effect of counterbalancing order
on children’s disgust beliefs. Thus, the analysis was collapsed into
a three-way 2 (group: disgust vs. fear)  3 (pairing type: negative,
happy, unpaired)  2 (time: before vs. after) mixed ANOVA.
There was a significant main effect of time, F(1, 56)  5.99, p 
.018, p2  .10, but not pairing type or group. All interactions but
one were nonsignificant, including the important Group  Pairing
Type  Time interaction, which showed that vicarious learning
was no different in the two groups. The other critical interaction,
the Pairing Type  Time interaction, was significant, F(1.67,
93.24)  4.13, p  .025, p2  .07 (Greenhouse–Geisser).
Planned contrasts found that disgust increased for disgust-paired
and fear-paired animals (prelearning: M  2.53, SD  0.93;
postlearning: M  2.56, SD  1.09) significantly more than
unpaired animals (prelearning: M  2.59, SD  0.92; postlearn-
ing: M  2.30, SD  0.96), F(1, 56)  7.24, p  .009, r  .34.
Figure 4 shows that actual increases were slight, and differences
were mainly due to decreases in disgust ratings for unpaired
animals. But changes in disgust beliefs for happy-paired animals
(prelearning: M 2.55, SD 0.83; postlearning: M 2.16, SD
1.01) were no different from those for unpaired animals, F(1,
56)  0.45, p  .51, r  .09.
Disgust VAS. Figure 6 displays the mean change in disgust
VAS ratings for the positive, negative, and unpaired animals
following vicarious fear and disgust learning. Again, a four-way 2
(group: disgust vs. fear)  3 (pairing type: negative, happy,
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Figure 4. Mean (and SE) changes in fear beliefs following fear and
disgust vicarious learning for negative-paired, happy-paired, and unpaired
animals.
Figure 5. Mean (and SE) changes in disgust beliefs following fear and
disgust vicarious learning for negative-paired, happy-paired, and unpaired
animals.
Figure 6. Mean (and SE) changes in self-reported disgust visual analogue
scale (VAS) ratings following fear and disgust vicarious learning for
negative-paired, happy-paired, and unpaired animals.
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unpaired) 2 (time: before vs. after) 3 (counterbalancing order:
cuscus disgust-paired, quokka disgust-paired, and quoll disgust-
paired) mixed ANOVA found no evidence that counterbalancing
order affected children’s vicarious learning of disgust and coun-
terbalancing order was removed from the main analysis.
A three-way 2 (group: disgust vs. fear)  3 (pairing type:
negative, happy, unpaired)  2 (time: before vs. after) mixed
ANOVA performed on changes in disgust VAS scores found a
significant main effect of pairing type, F(2, 112) 3.43, p .036,
p2  .058, but not of group or time. All interactions were nonsig-
nificant except for the important Pairing Type  Time interaction,
F(2, 112)  14.44, p  .001, p2  .21, which indicated that
vicarious learning had an effect on children’s disgust. However,
there was no significant Group  Pairing Type  Time interac-
tion, F(2, 112)  0.19, p  .83, p2  .003; thus, effects of
vicarious learning were similar in both groups.
The Pairing Type  Time effect was examined further by
planned contrasts. Disgust ratings for the negative-paired (fear-
and disgust-paired) animal (prelearning: M  44.78, SD  30.72;
postlearning: M  57.00, SD  33.35) increased significantly
more than those for the unpaired animal (prelearning: M  41.53,
SD  31.88; postlearning: M  40.29, SD  30.84), F(1, 56) 
4.82, p .032, r .28. Similarly, disgust ratings for happy-paired
animals (prelearning: M  53.19, SD  29.64; postlearning: M 
30.79, SD  30.28) decreased more than those for unpaired
animals, F(1, 56)  10.09, p  .002, r  .39.
Avoidance preferences. Figure 7 shows mean distances from
the negative (disgust and fear), happy, and unpaired animals for
both vicarious learning groups in the NRT. A two-way 2 (group:
disgust vs. fear)  3 (pairing type: negative, positive, unpaired)
mixed ANOVA was performed on avoidance preferences data.
There was a significant (Greenhouse–Geisser adjusted) main effect
of pairing type, F(1.79, 112)  8.08, p  .001, p2  .13, and
planned comparisons indicated greater avoidance of the negative-
paired (fear- and disgust-paired) animal compared to the unpaired
animal, F(1, 56)  7.81, p  .007, r  .35, but there was no
significant avoidance of the happy-paired animal compared to
the unpaired animal, F(1, 56)  2.57, p  .12, r  .21. The
main effect of type of vicarious learning group, F(1, 56)  1.14,
p  .29, r  .14, and the Pairing Type  Group interaction,
F(1.79, 100.28)  0.66, p  .52, p2  .01, were not significant.
Therefore, negative-paired animals were significantly avoided
compared to control animals, regardless of whether fear or
disgust faces were presented with animals during negative
learning.
Relationship between fear, disgust, and avoidance. As in
Experiment 1, correlational analyses were conducted on controlled
scores: changes in scores for fear- and disgust-paired animals
relative to unpaired animals. There were significant correlations
between increases in fear beliefs and avoidance preferences in the
fear, r(27)  .40, p  .033, and disgust, r(27)  .47, p  .01,
groups. Increases in disgust beliefs did not correlate significantly
with avoidance preferences for negatively paired animals in either
group: fear, r(27)  .22, p  .26; disgust, r(27)  .09, p  .64.
However, increases in disgust VAS scores were significantly as-
sociated with avoidance preferences for negatively paired animals
in both the fear, r(27)  .45, p  .014, and disgust, r(27)  .39,
p  .039, groups. Finally, increases in fear beliefs showed a
borderline significant correlation with disgust VAS scores in the
fear group, r(27)  .36, p  .059, but not the disgust group,
r(27)  .16, p  .41.
A Hayes (2013) mediation analysis showed a significant indirect
effect of increases in fear beliefs on avoidance preferences for
animals that was mediated by disgust VAS scores, b  11.209,
BCa CI [0.157, 28.445], showing a small effect, k2 .083, BCa CI
[.005, .206]. Figure 8 shows the mediation model (note that the
relationship between changes in fear beliefs and changes in disgust
VAS scores was only borderline significant, p  .071). Mediation
analyses conducted on disgust and fear groups separately did not
reach significance.
General Discussion
Two experiments investigated the effects of disgust and fear
vicarious learning on children’s fear beliefs, disgust beliefs and
ratings, and avoidance preferences for novel animals. Results
indicated that (a) disgust vicarious learning led to increases in
children’s fear beliefs for animals in both experiments, (b) children
rated animals in Experiment 2 as more disgusting after seeing them
in both fear- and disgust-paired vicarious learning, (c) children in
both experiments preferred to avoid animals they had seen in
disgust or fear vicarious learning procedures compared to control
animals, (d) increases in fear beliefs for animals were associated
with increases in disgust beliefs due to fear and disgust vicarious
learning, (e) increases in disgust beliefs (Experiment 1) and disgust
ratings (Experiment 2) for fear- and disgust-paired animals were
associated with increases in avoidance preferences for these ani-
mals relative to control animals, and (f) the relationship between
increases in fear beliefs and avoidance preferences was mediated
by increases in disgust for animals.
Both studies showed that children’s fear beliefs and avoidance
preferences for animals increased after they saw them together
with adult faces expressing disgust. Moreover, increases in chil-
dren’s fear beliefs for disgust-paired animals were related to their
Figure 7. Mean (and SE) distances (mm) following fear and disgust
vicarious learning for negative-paired, happy-paired, and unpaired animals
in the nature reserve task.
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disgust and avoidance preferences for them: Increased fear beliefs
for animals were associated with a greater preference to avoid
them and this was mediated by increases in disgust for the animals.
Matchett and Davey (1991) suggested in their disease-avoidance
model that one way the disgust emotion may play a role in fears is
by increasing avoidance aimed at preventing transmission of con-
tamination and disease. Consequently, a stimulus that becomes
associated for whatever reason with disgust might subsequently
be feared and avoided. Rozin and Fallon (1987) proposed that
disgust might be acquired via the nonverbal expressions of
others. The current findings support these suggestions, showing
that associating an animal with disgust during vicarious learn-
ing, by observing an adult expressing disgust for it, increases
children’s fear beliefs for the animal and leads to a disgust-
mediated preference to avoid it.
One implication of the disease-avoidance model is that we
would also expect to find increases in how disgusting children find
the animals. Experiment 1 did not find direct evidence of this: A
significant overall effect of vicarious learning on disgust beliefs
appeared to be due in the main to the difference in changes for
fear- and happy-paired animals. Similarly, significant effects of
negative vicarious learning on disgust beliefs in Experiment 2
appeared to be mainly due to decreases in disgust beliefs for
unpaired control animals, with disgust beliefs for negatively paired
animals increasing only slightly. Nevertheless, despite this lack of
significant overall increases in disgust beliefs, correlational anal-
yses for both experiments showed that the relationship between
increases in fear beliefs and avoidance preferences was mediated
by increases in children’s disgust for the animals. No difference
was found between disgust and fear vicarious learning. One ex-
planation for the findings may be that the measure of disgust
beliefs was not sensitive enough to detect significant overall
changes in disgust beliefs, despite these increases being related to
fear belief measures. Indeed, one potential weakness of the disgust
belief measure was that it was unclear whether unsatisfactory
Cronbach’s alpha scores were due to low reliability of the scale or
merely the low number of items; there were indications that the
latter interpretation was most likely. Fortunately, a much clearer
set of results was found using the disgust VAS scale in Experiment
2, which unambiguously indicated that both fear and disgust vi-
carious learning led to significant increases in how disgusting
children rated the animals. Again, these increases in disgust were
also significantly associated with avoidance preferences following
disgust and fear vicarious learning, and there was a borderline
significant (p  .059) association with increases in fear beliefs
following fear vicarious learning. Thus, the disgust VAS may be a
more sensitive measure of changes in children’s disgust for the
animals, presumably due to responses being on a continuum rather
than a discrete scale. A useful addition to future studies may be to
also use a comparable fear VAS. This may allow greater precision
in comparisons between fear and disgust learning.
One unexpected finding from Experiment 2 was that fear beliefs
increased significantly for disgust-paired but not fear-paired ani-
mals. This result is difficult to explain because previous studies
have consistently demonstrated that fear vicarious learning leads to
significant increases in children’s fear beliefs (Askew & Field,
2007; Askew et al., 2008; Dunne & Askew, 2013), heart rate
(Reynolds, Field, & Askew, 2014), avoidance preferences (Askew
et al., 2013; Dunne & Askew, 2013), and avoidance behavior
(Askew & Field., 2007; Reynolds et al., 2014). Moreover, Exper-
iment 2 found that avoidance preferences were greater for fear-
paired animals compared with controls, suggesting that a change in
threat-related cognitions had occurred. There was a small to me-
dium effect (r  .23) of increased fear beliefs that approached but
did not reach conventional levels of significance (p  .085), and
the most likely explanation is that the sample size in this group
(N  29) was too small to provide sufficient power to detect this
effect. Some indirect support for this comes from the mediation
analysis, which indicated that increases in fear beliefs for animals
following disgust and fear vicarious learning were related to in-
creases in avoidance preferences and were mediated by increases
in disgust beliefs. Overall, the significant difference between fear
and disgust groups was most likely due to differences in sizes of
effects of happy pairing, which was much larger in the fear group
(r  .59) than the disgust group (r  .04). Given that the happy
vicarious learning procedure was identical in the two groups, it is
strange that it produced much larger effects in the fear group. The
difference in effects was in part down to fear beliefs increasing for
unpaired animals in the fear group (perhaps owing to greater
generalization from fear-paired learning to unpaired animals), but
it was not only due to this. The large difference in effects is
difficult to explain, but it seems that seeing fear as opposed to
disgust faces with some animals also affects decreases in chil-
dren’s fear beliefs for animals seen with happy faces.
In their influential article on disgust, Rozin and Fallon (1987)
suggested that disgust is transmitted from person to person, for
example, from adult caregivers to children via social referencing.
The current study demonstrates that disgust can be transmitted
from adult stranger to child. An interesting follow-up study, with
important developmental implications, would be to investigate
whether children can also vicariously learn disgust from similarly
aged peers. The mechanisms underlying vicarious disgust learning
also remain unspecified. Vicarious fear learning is generally as-
sumed to be a form of associative learning (e.g., Askew & Field,
2007, 2008; Bandura, 1969; Berger, 1962; Hygge, 1976; Mineka
& Cook, 1993) in which a model’s fearful response to an animal
or object CS acts as a US for observing individuals, who associate
this US with the CS as a result of their contiguous presence
(Askew & Field, 2007, 2008; Mineka & Cook, 1993). Even if we
accept that disgust vicarious learning is also associative, the spe-
b = 1.064, p = .008 b = 10.529, p = .071 
Increase in disgust 
(DVAS) 
Avoidance 
preferences (NRT) 
Increase in fear 
beliefs (FBQ) 
Direct effect, b = 52.385, p = .003 
Indirect effect, b = 11.209, 95% CI [0.447, 29.910] 
Figure 8. Mediation model of increases in children’s fear beliefs follow-
ing negative (disgust and fear) vicarious learning as a predictor of avoid-
ance preferences and mediated by disgust beliefs for the animals. DVAS
disgust visual analogue scale; FBQ  fear beliefs questionnaire; NRT 
nature reserve task; CI  confidence interval.
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cific associations underlying vicarious disgust learning and vicar-
ious fear learning could theoretically be very different from each
other. For example, disgust-related events might lead to the for-
mation of associations more akin to those found in evaluative
conditioning, which may be qualitatively different from those
underlying classical conditioning (see, e.g., Hofmann, De Houwer,
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). This would be important
because this type of learning may be less affected by contingency
awareness (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990) and
extinction procedures (Baeyens, Crombez, Van den Bergh, &
Eelen, 1988), although the evidence for this is not entirely un-
equivocal (Hofmann et al., 2010). Future studies could investigate
the mechanisms underpinning disgust vicarious learning by testing
the need for awareness of pairing contingencies and whether
learned responses to animals extinguish during animal-only trials.
Furthermore, it would be possible to determine whether CS–US
associations underpin disgust vicarious learning using a US reval-
uation procedure.
The vicarious learning procedure used in the experiments rep-
resents a harmless laboratory analogue of how children acquire
fears in the real world. As a prospective paradigm with nonfearful
children, it can potentially inform theory about fear acquisition and
support the development and assessment of new fear prevention
and intervention strategies. For obvious ethical reasons, the mild
nature of the manipulation used meant that changes in fear re-
sponses were small compared with phobic levels of fear. But they
are significant for several reasons. First, a vicarious learning
episode in the real world is likely to be more intense than in the
current study, involving real animals and people and richer infor-
mation (e.g., sound and movement) that could lead to greater
learning. The current findings show that even relatively unthreat-
ening learning experiences can create avoidance preferences,
which in turn could mean that a stimulus is avoided and beliefs
about the threat it poses are not disconfirmed. Moreover, previous
studies looking at fear vicarious learning have shown that similar
increases in fear beliefs and avoidance preferences are related to
actual behavioral avoidance and increased heart rate when children
actually encounter the stimuli (Reynolds et al., 2014).
Given that CS–US associations are generally believed to be
formed during vicarious learning (Askew & Field, 2007, 2008;
Mineka & Cook, 1993), there are likely to be other implications for
the formation of fears. Even relatively innocuous CS–US associ-
ations, once learned, can potentially become pathological at a later
date because of US revaluation processes (Rescorla, 1974; White
& Davey, 1989). If the US is revalued as more aversive than first
thought, then the response to the CS will also increase if CS–US
associations underpin learning, although initial attempts by Askew
et al. (2008) to inflate the aversiveness of a US following vicarious
learning were unsuccessful at affecting responses to the CS. An
additional means by which existing fear beliefs can influence the
development of more serious fear is via the creation of negative
outcome expectancies that impact future learning (Davey, 1997;
Field & Davey, 2001). Expectancies about the outcome (US) of an
encounter with a CS can enhance what is learned about it in a
subsequent CS–US learning event: Entering an aversive learning
event with existing expectancies that the outcome (US) will be
negative can enhance fear learning for the CS. Thus, disgust-
related vicarious learning about a CS may prepare children to learn
fear should they encounter the CS in a threatening or harmful
situation in the future. Finally, the current findings have implica-
tions for prevention and intervention in fear acquisition. Increased
understanding about the role of observational disgust learning in
fears can inform caregivers and those working with children about
the effect of others’ behavior on children’s fear-related cognitions
for stimuli. In addition, knowledge about the role of disgust in the
formation of avoidance preferences during vicarious learning
events can give clinicians and theorists greater insight into the
processes involved in some fears. Understanding that fear and
disgust can develop via CS–US associations, if this is indeed the
case, could potentially allow clinicians to make better predictions
about the acquisition, course, and treatment of specific fears and
phobias.
A potential limitation of the study was that disgust sensitivity
was not measured. Given the importance of disgust sensitivity and
propensity in some fears (e.g., van Overveld et al., 2006), it would
be interesting to investigate whether these characteristics affect
susceptibility to disgust vicarious learning. One possibility, for
example, is that the relationship between changes in disgust beliefs
and changes in fear beliefs is mediated by disgust sensitivity. It is
also worth noting that statistical power to detect vicarious learning
effects is reliant on the discriminability of the stimuli used. If
children are confused about the identity of animals, this could
potentially decrease within-child and between-groups learning ef-
fects. Thus, learning for paired animals compared with unpaired
animals and, more important here, differences in learning between
disgust and fear groups could potentially be underestimated if
there is confusion about the visual appearance of animals. The
discriminability of animals was not directly examined here, but
these animals have been used successfully in previous vicarious
learning studies (e.g., Askew & Field, 2007; Askew et al., 2008,
2013; Dunne & Askew, 2013; Reynolds et al., 2014).
To summarize, two experiments showed that disgust vicarious
learning can lead to increases in children’s fear beliefs and avoid-
ance preferences for animals, and these increases are related to
increases in how disgusting they feel the animals to be following
learning. Fear vicarious learning also led to increases in children’s
disgust ratings for animals, suggesting a bidirectional relationship
between disgust and fear in vicarious learning.
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